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Banking Sector Competition in the 
Panzar-Rosse Framework and Net 
Interest Margins: An Empirical Analysis 
Using the General Method of Moments 
Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence on the determinants of net interest 
margins in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European countries (CESEE) 
during the period 1999–2009, with a particular focus on the relationship 
between banking sector competition and net interest margins. Using country-
level Panzar-Rosse H-statistic estimates as a measure of competition, and the 
General Method of Moments, it has been determined that banking sector 
competition had a negative impact on net interest margins. In order to check for 
consistency, alternative measures of competition, such as the Lerner index and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, have also been used. The results appear consistent 
and suggest that higher market power is associated with higher interest margins. 
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A number of interactions have been used to check for the impact of competition 
when interacted with other variables. The study also provides evidence on the 
impact of other bank-specific, macroeconomic, and institutional variables on net 
interest margins.
Keywords: bank competition, net interest margins, Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, 
General Method of Moments  
JEL classification: D4, E43, G21, P2 
1  Introduction
One of the key objectives of the transition process in the Central, Eastern, and 
Southeastern European countries (CESEE) was the establishment of sound and 
efficient banking sectors.1 After a decade of substantial reforms which, among 
others, included the privatization of state-owned banks and the “opening-up” 
to foreign bank entry, the banking sectors of the CESEE countries were able to 
achieve stability and improve the financial intermediation efficiency. The entry 
of the foreign banks was associated with the adoption of modern commercial 
banking practices, which led to a more prudent and efficient banking sector in all 
the countries. One of the standard measures of efficiency in the banking sector is 
the net interest margin (Claeys & Vennet, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 
1999). During the second decade of the transition process, net interest margins 
pursued a declining trend, but still remained at a higher level compared to the 
average of the euro area. 
High interest margins, despite the potential positive effects for the profitability 
and sustainability of the banks, are viewed as signals of financial intermediation 
inefficiency and, as such, are considered to have a negative impact on the overall 
economic activity (Chortareas, Garza-García, & Girardone, 2012). When 
interest margins are high, potential savers are discouraged by the low deposit 
1 Countries included in the analysis are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
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rates, and credit expansion is impeded by high lending rates, thus negatively 
affecting investments. This is particularly important for the CESEE and other 
countries that lack well-functioning equity markets. In the absence of developed 
equity and bond markets, financing options for the enterprises are much more 
limited, so the economy is more dependent on the financing from the banking 
sector and more sensitive to banks’ net interest margins.
The theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes a number of factors that are 
considered to have an important role in determining the level of interest margins. 
One of the factors most frequently “blamed” for the high level of interest margins 
is the lack of competition which provides banks with price-inelastic demand 
and supply functions that enable them to exert market power and set higher 
interest margins (Ho & Saunders, 1981). The relationship between competition 
and interest margins can also be viewed from the perspective of efficiency 
theories. Inefficient banks are predicted to set higher interest margins in order 
to compensate for the additional costs that arise from their cost inefficiencies. 
However, banks may be able to set higher interest margins to compensate for 
their inefficiencies only if banking markets operate under imperfect competition, 
otherwise the inefficient banks would not be able to survive in competitive 
markets.2 When competition increases, banks are likely to compete through 
their interest rates, with those applying lower interest margins being more likely 
to increase their market shares and survive in the market. However, banks may 
not necessarily be able to reduce their interest margins without enhancing their 
efficiency. Therefore, the increase of competition may induce banks to enhance 
their efficiency in order to be able to set more competitive interest margins. The 
discussion on the relationship between competition and efficiency was initiated 
by Hicks (1935) who came up with the “quiet life” hypothesis, which suggests 
that monopoly firms are less efficient compared to firms operating in more 
competitive markets. According to this hypothesis, monopoly banks’ managers 
live a “quiet life”, given that market power enables them to charge higher prices 
2 The hypothesis that banking systems operate in uncompetitive markets has been confirmed by many empirical 
studies, including De Bandt and Davis (2000), and Bikker, Spierdijk, and Finnie (2007).
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and, consequently, realize satisfactory profits without taking effort to cut their 
expenditures. The impact of banking sector competition on interest rate margins 
has also been treated in the literature addressing the link between competition 
and banks’ risk-taking. Most of the studies in this field focus on the competition 
for deposits, arguing that as banks face more competition they tend to attract 
additional deposits by offering higher deposit interest rates in order then to be 
able to seize larger shares in the loans market (Keeley, 1990; Hellman, Murdock, 
& Stiglitz, 2000; Repullo, 2004). Under competitive conditions, banks will 
not be able to compensate higher deposit rates by increasing loan rates. Instead, 
banks are more likely to reduce the loan interest rates when competition 
increases in order to maintain/increase their shares in the loans market. As a 
result, the increase of competition is expected to result in lower interest rate 
margins. However, some authors argue that the increase of competition does not 
necessarily lead to higher deposit rates. According to Cordella and Yeyati (1998), 
and Shy and Stenbacka (2004), when the bank risk is observable, depositors are 
ready to accept even lower interest rates on their deposits from the banks that are 
viewed as safer in terms of asset quality. Hence, instead of competing through 
interest rates, banks may decide to use the quality of their assets as a strategic 
instrument to compete in the market for deposits.
The investigation of the determinants of interest margins, including the impact 
of competition, has been subject of a broad range of empirical studies. One 
stream of the literature has used a two-stage model which is in line with the 
original “dealership model” of Ho and Saunders (1981)3, while the other stream 
of studies uses a single-stage model, which explains actual interest margins by 
various variables. 
The empirical studies investigating the determinants of interest margins, some 
of which have been reviewed below, have mostly found a negative relationship 
between banking sector competition and interest margins, suggesting that 
3 The first step involves the estimation of a “pure interest spread” by regressing observed margins on a number of 
bank-specific variables. In the second step, the estimated pure spreads are regressed on macroeconomic and market 
structure variables.
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higher competition leads to lower interest margins. Saunders and Schumacher 
(2000) investigated the determinants of interest rate margins in six selected 
EU countries and the USA for the period 1988–1995 and found that banks 
operating in markets that are more restricted in terms of geographic distribution 
in branching and universality of banking services appear to have higher interest 
rate spreads due to the higher monopoly power that banks may have. 
Studies have mostly used market concentration indices (mainly the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index) as a measure of competition and found a positive relationship 
with interest margin, suggesting that a higher degree of market concentration 
provides banks with a higher degree of market power which, in turn, enables 
them to set higher interest margins (Corvoisier & Gropp, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Leaven, & Levine, 2003; Peria & Mody, 2004; Gelos, 2006; Claeys & Vennet, 
2008). The use of market concentration indices as a measure of competition 
is based on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm which claims that a 
higher degree of concentration grants market power to incumbent firms and 
enables them to behave in particular ways, such as colluding with each other, 
which results in higher profits (Bain, 1951). Even though largely used in the 
literature, market concentration indices may not represent an adequate measure 
of competition. Based on the efficiency structure hypothesis, developed by Demsetz 
(1973), and the contestability theory, which was developed by Baumol (1982), 
and Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982), a higher degree of market concentration 
does not necessarily imply a less competitive market.4 Hence, the relationship 
between market concentration and interest margins, found in the empirical 
studies using the market concentration as a measure of competition, may not 
necessarily reflect the relationship between competition and interest margins.
Few studies have used more direct measures of market power/competition, which 
are known as non-structural measures of competition. In this regard, Chortareas 
et al. (2012), in a study covering nine Latin American countries for the period 
4 The efficiency structure hypothesis claims that higher profits realized by firms operating in concentrated markets 
are a result of the superior efficiency of larger firms, which derives from the economies of scale (Demsetz, 1973). 
According to the contestability theory, firms behave competitively also in a concentrated industry or even in a 
monopoly if the market is contestable (Baumol, 1982, and Baumol, Panzar & Willig, 1982).
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1999–2006 used the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic as a measure of competition and 
found a significantly negative relationship between the H-statistic and the net 
interest margin, suggesting that higher banking sector competition leads to lower 
interest margins. The Panzar-Rosse H-statistic was used also by Gelos (2006), but 
its relationship with the interest margin appeared statistically insignificant. Few 
studies have investigated this relationship for different samples of the CESEE 
region and, using market concentration indices as a measure of competition, 
suggested that competition reduces interest margins (Claeys & Vennet, 2008; 
Schwaiger & Liebeg, 2007; Kasman, Gokce, Vardar, & Okan, 2010). 
In order to estimate the relationship between banking sector competition and 
interest margins in CESEE countries, this paper uses the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic 
which we have estimated for each country and year. The Panzar-Rosse H-statistic 
is estimated using the Panzar and Rosse (1987) model (P-R model), which is 
a non-structural approach that measures competition by directly quantifying 
the conduct of firms and not taking into account the market structure. In 
assessing competition, the focus of the P-R model is on the competitive behavior 
of firms rather than on market structure. To best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study to use the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic in estimating the relationship 
between banking sector competition and interest margins for CESEE countries. 
In addition, the study employs the Lerner index, which is an alternative non-
structural measure of market power. In order to make our results comparable to 
other studies, we run an additional regression using the market concentration 
index (i.e. the Herfindahl-Hirschman index) instead of the competition measure. 
The regression controls also for the impact of other variables, including bank-
specific variables, macroeconomic variables, and institutional variables. For the 
dependent variable, we follow the majority of the studies in this field that use the 
net interest margin, which is the difference between lending and deposit rates 
expressed as a ratio of total earning assets. The estimation is dynamic, conducted 
on panel data, and uses the General Method of Moments.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section two presents an overview of the 
macroeconomic conditions and banking sector development in CESEE countries. 
Section three describes the model. The data and methodology are presented in 
sections four and five, respectively. Section six presents the estimation results and 
section seven the conclusions.
2  Macroeconomic Conditions and Banking  
     Sector Development in CESEE Countries
The poor macroeconomic environment at the beginning of the transition 
process that was characterized by a sharp decline of output and excessively high 
inflation rates represented a serious impediment to the efficient functioning of 
the banking system. However, the stabilization programs during the first decade 
of transition, which included sound monetary and fiscal policies, resulted in 
macroeconomic stability. The economic activity in the old unproductive sectors 
gradually declined while the new sectors that were able to compete in an open 
market economy started to grow (Fischer & Sahay, 2000). As a result, by 1999 
almost all CESEE countries recorded positive real GDP growth rates which 
generally remained quite steady until 2009 when the global crisis resulted in 
most CESEE countries recording negative growth rates (Table 1). Despite the 
similarities in growth rates, a wide gap remains when CESEE countries’ GDPs 
per capita are compared with each other. The more advanced CESEE countries, 
namely the EU member countries, have considerably higher GDP per capita 
compared to other countries of the region, thus reflecting substantial divergences 
in terms of the degree of economic development. The country with the lowest 
GDP per capita is Kosovo (USD 1,814), while the country with the highest GDP 
per capita is Slovenia (USD 16,486).
CESEE countries were also successful in bringing down their inflation rates, 
which had represented a serious macroeconomic problem at the beginning of the 
transition. All countries except Serbia and Romania were successful in reducing 
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the inflation to one-digit rates by 1999. By 2007, inflation rates had dropped to 
one-digit rates in Serbia and Romania too.
Table 1:  Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, Average Values for the Period 1999–2009
Real GDP  
growth rates  
(in %)





Albania 6.5 2,367 2.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4.7 2,960 1.7
Bulgaria 4.7 3,581 6.2
Croatia 2.8 9,266 3.3
The Czech Republic 3.4 11,705 3.3
Estonia 4.5 9,404 4.2
Hungary 2.4 9,430 6.5
Kosovo 4.5 1,814 1.6
Latvia 4.6 7,191 5.7
Lithuania 4.3 7,197 2.8
Macedonia 2.9 2,830 2.4
Montenegro 3.8 3,736 21.2
Poland 4.0 7,683 3.9
Romania 4.1 4,441 19.1
Serbia 4.0 3,438 27.3
Slovakia 4.2 10,389 5.9
Slovenia 3.3 16,486 5.0
Sources: European Commission (2010), International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2010), and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2009).
The second decade of the transition process was also characterized by substantial 
reforms in the banking system. More specifically, this period marked a reduction 
in the role of the state in the banking system, the privatization of state-owned 
banks progressed rapidly, and the market opened up to the entry of foreign-
owned banks. This is the period when the banking system stability, in the sense 
of the banking sector being capable of withstanding the shocks and allocating the 
savings into profitable investment projects (European Central Bank’s definition 
of financial stability), was more clearly achieved.
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The competitive conditions in the banking sectors of the region were difficult at 
the beginning of the transition process. With the break-up of the mono-bank 
system, the banking system experienced the creation of oligopolistic market 
structures in most of transition economies (Papi & Revoltella, 1999). However, 
the privatization process and the entry of foreign banks led to the increase of 
banking sector competition in these markets.
The interest rate spreads were initially high, potentially reflecting the high market 
power and operational inefficiencies and the other deficiencies of the operating 
environment. However, as the transition progressed, the interest rates followed 
a declining trend in all the CESEE countries (Table 2). The decline is consistent 
with the increasing presence of foreign banks in the region which seems to have 
increased the degree of banking efficiency and banking system competition. 
Moreover, this period was also characterized by a more favorable macroeconomic 
performance. The improvements in the banks’ operating environment and 
enhanced “know-how” on the side of banks led to a reduction of non-performing 
loans, thus leading to lower risk premiums embedded in the interest rates.
As Table 2 shows, there are significant differences between the spreads in EU 
member states and other countries, with the latter having higher interest rate 
spreads during the whole period. However, the differences between the EU and 
non-EU countries appear to have narrowed in the last years.
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3  Model Description
For the estimation of the determinants of interest margins, we follow the single-
stage dealership model. The explanatory variables in our model consist of bank-
specific variables as well as country-specific macroeconomic and institutional 
variables that are included to capture the impact of interest margins stemming 
from differences in the general environment where banks operate. The model 









































where i (1,...n) indexes the banks and t (1,..,T) the years. The description of 
variables is presented in Table 3.
Table 3:  Description of Variables
Variables Description
Nim Net interest margin: (interest income – interest expenses) / average earning assets
Lagnim First lag of the net interest margin
h-stat Panzar Rosse H-statistic
equity_ta Equity / total assets
nonintinc_ta Total non-interest operating income / total assets
loggross_loans Logarithm of gross loans
prov_loans Loan-loss provisions / total loans
lqdassets_custstfunding Liquid assets / customer deposits and short-term funding
nonintexp_ta Total non-interest expenses / total assets
earningassets_ta Total earning assets / total assets
bankdep_custdep Bank deposits / customer deposits
ebrd_bankref EBRD index of banking reform
economic_freedom_hrt Economic Freedom index (Heritage Foundation)
rgdpgrowth Real GDP growth rate
Source: Authors’ construction. 
5 Because of the suspected endogenous relationship with the dependent variable, a number of variables are included 
in lags.
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For the dependent variable we follow the majority of studies that investigate the 
determinants of interest margins by using the Net Interest Margin (NIM), which 
is calculated as total interest income minus total interest expenditures divided by 
total earning assets. Most of the studies investigating the determinants of net 
interest margins, based on the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, 
use the market concentration indices to control for banking sector competition. 
However, given that the SCP paradigm has been heavily criticized by other 
theories such as the efficient structure hypothesis and the contestability theory, 
which claim that more concentrated markets do not necessarily reveal a higher 
degree of market power, it may be considered that market concentration may 
not represent an adequate measure of banking sector competition. Taking into 
account these criticisms, we consider that inferences on the relationship between 
competition and net interest margins derived from studies that use the degree 
of market concentration as a proxy for competition might be questionable. 
Therefore, to control for the impact of banking sector competition on net interest 
margins, we use the H-statistic (h_stat1) that is produced by using the Panzar-
Rosse approach, which directly quantifies the competitive behavior of a bank.6 
This is the first study to use the H-statistic as a measure of competition within 
the literature investigating the determinants of bank interest margins in CESEE 
countries, and one of the few in the literature in this field. The H-statistic has 
been obtained by running cross-section estimations for each of the countries 
and years included in our sample.7 Unlike other studies that use H-statistic as a 
measure of competition (Gelos, 2006; Chortareas et al., 2012), we acknowledge 
that the H-statistic is an estimated variable and therefore apply the bootstrapping 
technique to correct its standard errors. Since the literature applying the Panzar-
Rosse approach has not come to a general conclusion on the choice of dependent 
variable in such a regression, for comparative purposes, we apply separately two 
6 The P-R model produces the so-called H-statistic, which measures the sum of elasticities of bank’s revenues with 
respect to input prices. The H-statistic indicates how bank’s revenues respond to an increase of input prices and 
takes values from below 0 to 1. An H ≤ 0 implies that banks’ competitive behavior is consistent with monopoly; 
0 < H < 1 implies that banks’ behavior is consistent with monopolistic competition; and H = 1 implies perfect 
competition. 
7 The H-statistic estimates for each sample country and year are available upon request.
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alternatives of H-statistic as a measure of competition.8 In line with Vesala (1995), 
and Claessens and Laeven (2004), the H-statistic is interpreted as a continuous 
variable.
In order to verify our inferences on the impact of competition on the net 
interest margin, we run a separate model using the Lerner index (lerner_index) 
as a measure of market power.9 The Lerner index is obtained from the study of 
Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2014) who have estimated this index for individual 
CESEE countries for each year in the period 2002–2010.10 The Lerner index 
is considered to be inversely related to the H-statistic, with higher values of 
the Lerner index implying higher market power. For comparison with other 
studies, we also run a regression that controls for the impact of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (hhi_dep), which is a measure of market concentration. The 
three measures of competition considered in this paper have been used separately 
in other studies. We use the three of them in this paper. By doing this, we wish 
to derive more reliable inferences on the relationship between banking sector 
competition and interest rate margins, but also provide evidence that can be used 
to validate the consistency of the three measures of competition.
Even though the original dealership model does not consider bank’s ownership to 
be among the determinants of interest margins, some authors argue that foreign 
ownership may have an important role in the determination of interest margins 
through channels like efficiency and loan portfolio quality (Lehner & Schnitzer, 
2008; Claeys & Hainz, 2007). Given that the readily available Bankscope 
database provides information only on the current ownership of the bank, we 
utilize the shareholders’ history from this database through which we identify the 
bank’s ownership for the available years. Based on this information, we construct 
8 The dependent variable in a Panzar-Rosse model may be the bank’s interest income or the total income. Since there 
is no conclusive argument on which is more appropriate, in order to test for robustness, we have run separate cross-
section estimations using both the interest income as the dependent variable and the total income. The h_stat1 
variable was estimated using interest income as the dependent variable; and the h_stat3 was estimated using total 
income as the dependent variable.
9 The Lerner index measures the mark-up of price over the marginal costs. Higher values of the index indicate a 
higher degree of market power.
10 The Lerner index estimates are not available for Estonia and Lithuania.
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a dummy variable (dv_foreign) which takes the value of 1 when the bank is more 
than 51 percent foreign-owned and 0 when the bank is domestically owned. In 
addition, unlike other studies, we distinguish also between the countries of origin 
of the foreign banks included in the sample. According to Haselmann (2006), 
the activity of foreign banks in the transition economies is mostly determined 
by the strategic considerations of the parent banks, where the country of origin 
may play an important role with regard to the strategy and business culture of 
the bank. Therefore, we construct a dummy variable (dv_origin) which takes the 
value of 1 if the bank is an EU-1211 country or the USA and 0 if the bank’s origin 
is some other country. The model also controls for other bank-specific variables, 
institutional variables, and macroeconomic variables.
4  Data Description
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model 
discussed in section two and the data used for the estimation. As Table 4 shows, 
all the variables are continuous apart from two dummies, which stand for the 
ownership of the bank (i.e. foreign vs. domestic) and the origin country of the 
banks. From the summary statistics, it can be observed that there is sufficient 
variability in the data. 
The bank-level data that are used in our estimation are sourced from the 
Bankscope database. Bankscope is a comprehensive global database that contains 
banks’ financial statements and other bank data. The study includes data on 
285 banks from 15 CESEE countries over the period 1999–2009. Nevertheless, 
it must be emphasized that the initial years suffer from a pronounced rate of 
missing data. The data on the real GDP growth rate have been obtained from the 
European Commission (the AMECO database) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), whereas the GDP per capita and inflation data were obtained from 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The banking 
11 EU-12 includes the signatories of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
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reform index is obtained from the EBRD, whereas the Economic Freedom index 
is obtained from the Heritage Foundation.
Table 4:  Summary Statistics
Variable     Obs      Mean St. Dev.    Min       Max
nim 2915 5.0 3.8 -16.9 38.8
Lagnim 2470 5.1 3.9 -12.1 38.8
h_stat1 2650 -1.2 2.1 -11.7 5.2
equity_ta 2926 15.4 13.3 -12.4 98.7
nonintinc_ta 2912 2.9 4.9 -5.4 85.7
loggross_loans 2908 12.3 1.9 4.8 17.2
prov_loans 2628 1.9 4.9 -48.2 49.7
lqdassets_custstfunding 2894 46.8 39.3 0.0 586.2
nonintexp_ta 2908 4.6 4.5 -1.0 75.8
earningassets_ta 2919 85.0 12.3 0.5 99.9
bankdep_custdep 2626 2.4 19.4 0.0 478.0
ebrd_bankref1 2914 3.3 0.6 1.0 4.0
economic_freedom_hrt 2676 59.8 7.5 29.4 78.0
rgdpgrowth 2909 4.0 4.2 -17.7 13.5
gdp_percap 2925 7709.1 5039.1 933.4 27128.5
cpi_ebrd 2926 6.6 9.6 -2.7 97.1
dv_foreign 2155 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0
dv_origin 2155 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
Source: Authors’ calculations.
5  Methodology 
The estimation of the determinants of net interest margins for our sample of data 
is conducted using the system General Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic 
panel estimator, which was initially developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
extended by Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). The 
“system” GMM estimates the model by creating a system of two equations for 
each time period, where one is a first-order differenced model instrumented by 
lagged levels as in Arellano and Bond (1991), and the other is an equation where 
variables are held in their original levels and instrumented with lags of their own 
first differences.
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The reasons to use the system GMM approach include:
First, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in static, fixed effects estimation 
of our panel data rejects the hypothesis of no autocorrelation, hence suggesting 
that our model should be estimated with a dynamic approach. In order to avoid 
the potential endogeneity problems between the lagged dependent variable and 
the error term in a fixed effect model, we use the system GMM approach which 
overcomes this problem by using instrumental variables from within the dataset. 
Second, it enables the consideration of both the time and cross-sectional variation 
in the model.
Third, the error term in the GMM model allows for bank-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity.
Fourth, it is suitable for data sets with a large number of cross-section observations 
(N) and short time-series (T), which is the case with our sample.
Fifth, apart from the statistical reasons, there is also an economic rationale for 
using a dynamic model. The dynamic model enables us to capture the persistence 
of the dependent variable when there is at least some degree of continuity in the 
banking environment and banking behavior. The underlying reason why this is 
possible with a dynamic model is that the lagged dependent variable captures the 
entire time-path (or history) of the dependent variable. In other words, history is 
accounted for in a dynamic model, while it remains excluded in a static model. 
In order to ensure that our model does not suffer from misspecification issues, 
we have run a number of diagnostic tests, including the test for the validity of 
instruments, the test for the cross-sectional dependence and we have also checked 
the size of the lagged dependent variable coefficient. All the above-mentioned 
diagnostic tests suggest that our model is well specified.12
12 The results of the diagnostic tests are available upon request.
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6  Estimation Results
Table 5 presents a number of different model specifications, where the first 
column (specification 1) presents the main specification and the rest are 
alternative specifications, which are mainly included to test for robustness. 
The lagged dependent variable (Lagnim) is highly significant in all model 
specifications, thus confirming the dynamic nature of our model and showing 
that net interest margins are persistent over time and follow a gradual adjustment 
toward new conditions. The coefficient of 0.628 (specification 1) shows a moderate 
persistence of the lagged net interest margin, suggesting that interest margins in 
the current year reflect to some extent interest margins from the previous year.
As expected, our results show a statistically significant negative impact of the 
H-statistic on the net interest margin, suggesting that competition has contributed 
to the decline of net interest margins of banks in CESEE countries. The negative 
relationship between banking sector competition and interest margins was also 
found by a number of authors examining this relationship for different samples 
of developed countries, such as Ho and Saunders (1981), Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999), and Saunders and Schumacher (2000). 
The coefficient of the H-statistic (h_stat1) in our estimation is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent confidence level. Since we use a dynamic model to 
estimate the impact of competition on net interest margins, we are also able to 
estimate the long-run impact of competition. In the long run, the H-statistic 
has a coefficient of -0.66, which suggests that in the long run the impact of 
competition on net interest margins remains negative and the impact is larger 
than in the short run. The reduction of interest margins in the face of increased 
competition reflects the strategy of banks for increasing/maintaining their 
market share. In order to do so, banks may reduce their interest margins by 
offering higher interest rates on deposits in order to become more attractive in 
the deposits market and apply lower interest rates on loans in order to increase 
their competitiveness in the credit market. 
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Table 5:  Estimation Results, Dependent Variable: Net Interest Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES
Lagnim 0.628*** 0.638*** 0.639*** 0.612*** 0.647*** 0.666*** 0.592***
(0.086) (0.082) (0.088) (0.106) (0.083) (0.070) (0.081)
h_stat1 -0.029* -0.016 -0.033* 0.178**









equity_ta 0.036** 0.041** 0.031* 0.038* 0.041** 0.034* -0.007
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021)
nonintinc_ta -0.108 -0.142 -0.078 -0.100 -0.112 -0.171* -0.239**
(0.099) (0.106) (0.084) (0.104) (0.106) (0.089) (0.113)
loggross_loans 0.190* 0.190* 0.149 0.170* 0.214** 0.237** 0.035
(0.098) (0.101) (0.100) (0.102) (0.084) (0.101) (0.063)
prov_loans 0.076 0.093 0.072 0.086 0.097** 0.075 0.022
(0.050) (0.072) (0.066) (0.060) (0.049) (0.072) (0.050)
lqdassets_custstfunding -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
nonintexp_ta 0.132 0.120 0.098 0.136 0.171* 0.179** 0.271***
(0.101) (0.119) (0.101) (0.113) (0.097) (0.083) (0.091)
earningsassets_ta -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.025***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
bankdep_custdep 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ebrd_bankref1 -0.005 0.093 -0.035 0.239 0.211 -0.156 0.186
(0.230) (0.269) (0.242) (0.264) (0.238) (0.205) (0.240)
economic_freedom_hrt -0.028** -0.023 -0.027** -0.022 -0.021 -0.019 -0.032*
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017)
rgdpgrowth 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.045*** 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.051*** 0.055***
(0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012)
gdp_percap 0.00005** 0.00005** 0.00004** 0.00003 0.00004* 0.00002 0.00006**
(0.00002) (0.0002) (0.00002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
cpi_ebrd 0.010 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.001 0.011 0.015
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.015)
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dv_foreign -0.133 -0.158 -0.090 -0.122 -0.165*
(0.089) (0.104) (0.094) (0.100) (0.097)
dv_origin -0.013 0.010 -0.005 0.015 0.005





dv_year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
dv_country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.320 0.954 3.463 2.458 0.598 1.860 4.161**
(2.127) (2.481) (2.287) (2.184) (1.988) (2.239) (1.972)
Observations 1,498 1,498 1,498 1,380 1,530 1,822 1,498
Number of banks 285 285 285 265 285 347 285
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; a) specification (1) includes the h_stat1 
as a measure of competition; specification (2) includes the interaction term between the h_stat1 and the dummy 
variable for the non-EU countries (hstat1_dvnoneu); specification (3) includes the h_stat3 as a measure of competition; 
specification (4) includes the Lerner index (lerner_index) as a measure of market power; specification (5) replaces the 
measure of competition with the degree of market concentration (i.e. the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, hhi_dep); 
specification (6) excludes the foreign ownership variables; specification (7) includes the interaction term between 
operating expenses (nonintexp_ta) and the degree of competition (h_stat1).
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Since the H-statistic is an estimated variable from a first-stage regression, when 
used in the second-stage regression it may carry over imprecisions from the 
first stage. Hence, we apply the bootstrapping technique in order to correct the 
standard errors of the H-statistic (Table 6). This is a conservative approach to 
inference with bootstrapping typically yielding standard errors on our estimate 
of the H-statistic (h_stat1) that are somewhat larger than the default cluster-
robust standard errors.
Table 6:  Bootstrapped Standard Errors of h_stat1
  Observed   Bootstrap Normal-based
    Coef.   Std. Err. z P > z [95% conf. interval]
_bs_1 -0.029 0.017 -1.73 0.084 -0.061 0.004
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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The bootstrapped standard errors confirm our results in that the banking sector 
competition has a significantly negative impact on the net interest margin. 
Apart from estimating the average impact of competition on the net interest 
margin for the overall sample, we run an additional estimation where we check 
whether competition in non-EU countries of our sample affects banks’ net 
interest margins differently compared to the EU countries of our sample. Our 
variable of competition h_stat1 interacted with the dummy variable for the non-
EU countries (dv_noneu) that takes the value of 1 when the country is not an 
EU member country. The interaction term between the h_stat1 and the dv_
noneu is denoted as hstat1_dvnoneu.13 However, the coefficient of the interaction 
term appears statistically insignificant, suggesting that the relationship between 
competition and interest margins in non-EU countries of our sample does not 
differ significantly from the relationship in the EU countries of our sample 
(Table 5, specification 2). 
Apart from the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (h_stat1), we also include a number 
of alternative measures of competition/market power in order to check for 
consistency between different measures of competition. 
In specification 3, as a measure of competition, we use an alternative H-statistic 
variable (h_stat3), which differs from h_stat1 based on the model specification 
that was used when this variable was estimated.14 The estimation results appear 
robust, with h_stat3 having a negative and statistically significant coefficient at 
the 10 percent confidence level, which has a similar size to the h_stat1. This 
might also be an important contribution to the literature using the Panzar-Rosse 
approach since it shows that regardless of whether the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic 
is estimated with interest income or total income as the dependent variable, 
13 The inclusion of the interaction term is done in line with Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), who suggest that in 
case of multiplicative interaction models, the regression should include all the constitutive terms of the interaction 
term and the interaction term itself. The authors suggest that the coefficients of the constitutive terms should 
not be interpreted as average effects. The coefficient of one component term can be interpreted only under the 
assumption that the other component of the interaction term equals zero.
14 The h_stat3 variable was obtained by estimating the Panzar-Rosse model for each country/year using total income 
as the dependent variable.
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the inferences on the relationship between banking sector competition and net 
interest margins remain similar.
Another model specification replaces the H-statistic with the Lerner index 
(lerner_index), which is a measure of market power (Table 5, specification 4). 
The coefficient on the lerner_index is positive and highly significant, suggesting 
that higher market power leads to higher net interest margins. This finding is 
consistent with our results which suggest that higher competition (i.e. lower 
market power) leads to lower interest margins. The robustness of our results is 
shown also by other control variables that retain the same sign and mostly the 
same level of statistical significance when using the H-statistic for the measure of 
competition and when using the Lerner index. 
In specification 5, we replace the H-statistic with the market concentration 
index (hhi_dep) which is, despite many critiques in the literature, broadly 
used as a measure of market power. The estimation results suggest that market 
concentration has a positive and statistically significant impact on the net 
interest margin. As it can be seen from the results, the three different measures 
of competition, i.e. the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, the Lerner index, and the 
market concentration index (the Herfindahl-Hirschman index) have produced 
consistent results, which might serve as evidence in favor of the use of these 
variables to measure the banking sector competition. 
As shown in Table 5, the estimation results for the control variables are quite 
robust across different model specifications, so in the interpretation of results we 
will focus on our main model specification (specification 1).
The risk-aversion variable, proxied by the equity to total assets ratio 
(equity_ta), has a positive coefficient which is statistically significant at the 5 
percent confidence level, suggesting that bank’s equity ratio plays an important 
role in the determination of the net interest margin.15 According to this result, 
banks that maintain higher equity ratio tend to have higher net interest margins. 
15 Banks holding higher equity ratios are considered to be more risk-averse because the costs associated with a 
potential bankruptcy would imply the loss of their equity.
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Since equity financing is considered to be more expensive than other forms of 
financing and bears a higher opportunity cost, banks tend to compensate this 
cost by charging higher loan interest rates (Ho & Saunders, 1981). In addition, 
since more capitalized banks are considered to be safer, a higher equity ratio may 
enable the bank to attract deposits at a lower interest rate, which will lead to a 
higher net interest margin (Claeys & Vennet, 2008). 
The diversification of bank’s activity, measured by the non-interest income to 
total assets ratio (nonintinc_ta) has the expected negative coefficient, but is 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that the diversification of banks’ activity 
toward the non-interest generating assets did not have a significant impact on 
net interest margins in CESEE countries. This may be related to the fact that the 
share of non-interest generating assets in the banking sectors of CESEE countries 
is still low and, as such, banks may not significantly rely on this source of income 
to compensate potential reductions in the income from the interest-generating 
assets. 
Similar to Maudos & Fernández de Guevara (2004), we have included the 
loggross_loans variable to proxy for the average size of bank’s transactions. This 
variable has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 10 percent 
confidence level, suggesting that banks with larger loans in their portfolios tend 
to apply higher interest rate margins. Banks may apply higher risk premiums on 
larger loans given that the potential default on larger loans is expected to incur 
larger losses. The use of this variable as a proxy for the average size of bank’s 
transactions is done based on the assumption that larger banks tend to conduct 
larger size transactions compared to smaller banks.
The variable controlling for the quality of the loan portfolio, i.e. the credit risk 
(prov_loans), has the expected positive sign but its coefficient is statistically 
insignificant. Nevertheless, since its p-value is 0.133, this variable might be 
considered as borderline at the 10 percent confidence level. A positive coefficient 
of this variable suggests that banks with lower-quality loan portfolios tend to 
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charge higher loan interest rates in order to compensate for the potential losses 
occurring from the defaulted loans. In addition, since potential loan repayment 
problems usually start to take place in a later stage after the loan has been 
disbursed, banks facing higher credit risk tend to charge higher loan interest 
rates in order to collect a higher amount of interest during the period that the 
loan is performing which, to some extent, would compensate the losses from a 
potential default in the future. 
The variable consisting of liquid assets expressed as a percentage of customer 
deposits and short-term funding (lqdassets_custstfunding), which is included 
in the regression to control for the opportunity cost of holding reserves, has 
a statistically insignificant impact.16 This suggests that the opportunity cost 
of holding reserves was not significantly incorporated in banks’ interest rates. 
However, even though the reserves may compose a considerable part of liquid 
assets, the total amount of liquid assets may still not be an appropriate proxy for 
the reserves. Hence, this variable might not properly account for the true impact 
of banks’ reserves on net interest margins.
The coefficient on the non-interest operating expenditures to total assets ratio 
(nonintexp_ta), which may serve as a proxy for the cost-inefficiency of the banks, 
has the expected positive sign but is statistically insignificant. Banks with higher 
non-interest expenses (i.e. overhead costs) would be expected to set higher 
interest margins in order to compensate for the higher level of their operating 
expenses. However, the statistically insignificant impact of this variable might be 
attributed to the fact that our regression controls for bank’s foreign ownership 
whose impact on net interest margins might be to a degree channeled through the 
bank’s cost efficiency. In order to test for this, we have run a separate regression 
(specification 6), in which we exclude the foreign ownership variables. After 
excluding the ownership variables, the coefficient of the nonintexp_ta variable 
becomes statistically significant and retains a positive sign, suggesting that more 
inefficient banks tend to set higher net interest margins in order to compensate 
16 The use of liquid assets as a proxy for bank reserves has also been done by Poghosyan (2010), and Männasoo 
(2012).
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for higher operating expenses. This finding may serve as supporting evidence 
to the view expressed by Poghosyan (2010), who suggests that the control for 
foreign ownership may not be necessary in a dealership model, given that the 
channels through which foreign ownership may affect interest margins (such as 
efficiency and competition) are already controlled for in such models. 
Supposing that the degree to which banks can compensate their cost inefficiencies 
by setting higher interest margins may depend on how competitive the market 
is, we run an alternative model specification in which we include the interaction 
term between the operating expenses (nonintexp _ta) and the competition 
variable H-statistic (specification 7).17 The interaction term is denoted as 
hstat1_nonintexpta. The higher the degree of competition, the lower the expected 
ability of banks to transfer their cost inefficiencies into higher interest margins. 
The estimation results from this model specification show that the interaction 
term hstat1_nonintexpta has a statistically significant negative coefficient, which 
suggests that the increasing impact of the operating expenditures on the net 
interest margin is reduced when competition increases. In other words, this 
finding suggests that inefficient banks are less able to charge higher interest rates 
when the market is competitive and, consequently, less likely to survive in a 
competitive market. 
The model also controls for the impact of the quality of management on the net 
interest margin. The quality of management is proxied by the earning assets to 
total assets ratio (earningsassets_ta), with a higher ratio implying a better quality 
of management. The coefficient on the earningsassets_ta is negative and highly 
significant, suggesting that banks with better management quality tend to 
operate with lower net interest margins. The share of the deposits from banks to 
total customer deposits (bankdep_custdep), which is included in the regression to 
control for the composition of deposits, is statistically insignificant showing that 
the composition of deposits does not appear to be relevant for the determination 
of net interest margins.
17 This specification does not control for foreign ownership (dv_foreign and dv_origin) because when these variables 
are included, the non-interest expenditures to total assets ratio (nonintexp_ta) turned statistically insignificant.
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The Economic Freedom index (economic_freedom_hrt), which is included in the 
regression to control for the overall institutional environment in each country, is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level with a negative coefficient. 
This suggests that countries with a higher Economic Freedom index which, 
among others, implies better protection of property rights and lower corruption 
are characterized by lower interest rate margins. A higher Economic Freedom 
index indicates a less uncertain operating environment for the banks, which 
might be reflected in lower risk premiums on the loan interest rates. The EBRD 
banking reform index (ebrd_bankref ) has a statistically insignificant coefficient.
Regarding the macroeconomic variables, the results suggest that the real GDP 
growth rate (rgdpgrowth) has a positive and highly significant impact on the net 
interest margin (statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level). This 
may be reflecting the positive impact of GDP growth on the demand for loans, 
which makes upward pressure on loan interest rates. A positive coefficient is also 
found for the GDP per capita (gdp_percap), which is included in the regression to 
control for the overall level of economic development in each country. Its impact 
on the net interest margin in principle is expected to be negative, assuming that 
banks operating in more developed countries face lower levels of risk and, as 
such, apply lower risk premiums on their loan interest rates. 
The variable on the inflation rate (cpi_ebrd) turned out to be statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that banks’ net interest margins in CESEE countries 
have not been significantly responsive to the change of inflation rates. Statistically 
insignificant appear also the dummy variables on foreign ownership (dv_foreign) 
and on the banks’ countries of origin (dv_origin), suggesting that net interest 
margins of the foreign-owned banks are not significantly different from the net 
interest margins of the domestically-owned banks.
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7  Conclusions
Both the theoretical and empirical literature generally agrees that competition 
leads to lower interest margins. However, the vast majority of empirical studies 
that have investigated this relationship have used the market concentration 
index as a measure of competition, which may make the inferences derived by 
these studies on the relationship between competition and net interest margins 
questionable.
Therefore, in order to provide a more reliable picture regarding this relationship, 
we have used the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic to estimate the impact of banking 
sector competition on net interest margins in CESEE countries during the period 
1999–2009. To our knowledge, this is the first study to use the H-statistic as a 
measure of banking sector competition when investigating the determinants of 
net interest margins in CESEE countries. The estimation is performed on panel 
data with a dynamic model, using the General Method of Moments approach. 
Our estimation results suggest that the banking sector competition has had a 
significantly negative impact on net interest margins in CESEE countries. This 
implies that the decline of the interest rate spreads that took place in CESEE 
countries during the period 1999–2009 was significantly driven by the increase 
of banking sector competition. The results suggest that the relationship between 
competition and interest margins in non-EU countries of the sample is not 
statistically different from the relationship in the EU countries of the sample.
In order to make our inferences on the relationship between the banking sector 
competition and the net interest margin more credible, we have also used some 
alternative measures of banking sector competition. First, we estimated an 
alternative Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, by using the total income instead of the 
interest income when estimating the H-statistic. The results remain similar, 
suggesting that both versions of the H-statistic produce consistent results. Second, 
we used the Lerner index as a measure of market power and the results show a 
significantly positive impact, thus confirming our finding that market power 
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leads to higher net interest margins. Third, we included the market concentration 
index (the Herfindahl-Hirschman index), which has a significantly positive 
coefficient, suggesting that banks operating in more concentrated markets 
have higher net interest margins. These findings suggest that the three different 
measures of competition, albeit differing substantially in the way they measure 
competition, produce consistent results.
Regarding the impact of the control variables, the estimation results suggest 
that banks holding higher capitalization ratios tend to have higher net interest 
margins. Similarly, the average size of the loan transactions appears to be 
associated with higher interest rates, possibly reflecting higher potential risks 
that are associated with larger transactions. Operating costs appear to have a 
positive impact on net interest margins, but the ability of banks to translate 
higher operating costs into higher net interest margins appears to decline as 
competition increases. Better management quality appears to be associated 
with lower interest margins. The degree of economic freedom has a significantly 
negative effect, which may be reflecting the fact that more reformed countries 
are viewed as less uncertain by the banks and, hence, lower risk premiums are 
applied. Regarding the macroeconomic indicators, both the real GDP growth 
rate and the GDP per capita appear to have a significantly positive impact on net 
interest margins.
Acknowledging the importance of lower net interest margins for a more efficient 
financial intermediation and, consequently, better financing conditions for the 
economy, the findings of this paper may be considered as a suggestion directed 
at the authorities with hopes of enhancing the conditions for the development of 
healthy competition in the baking system. In addition, special attention should 
be given to the improvement of the different aspects of the overall operating 
environment, some of which have been covered in this paper. Even though 
our findings may suggest that the negative relationship between competition 
and net interest margins may serve as evidence in support of a positive link 
between competition and financial intermediation, further research in this 
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area is desirable. In order to have a more complete picture regarding the effects 
associated with higher competition, it would be desirable to also investigate the 
impact of competition on other indicators such as the access of firms to bank 
financing and the general financial inclusion rate. 
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